Public vs. Market

I am taking a class at Harvard School of Public Health this term called "Health Care Issues: Public vs. Market."  It is a cumbersome title, but defines the topic and scope of the course well.  Essentially it applies the debate between free markets and government intervention to the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Our first policy memo (which kind of blends into an essay in my case) was about our personal thoughts on the public vs. market debate.  Are there times when government intervention in health care is necessary and if so, when and how?  I offer up a few suggestions.

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MEMORANDUM
To: Speaker of the House
From: Jason Kroening-Roche
Re: Public vs. Market in Health Care Reform
Date: January 30, 2012

            We are at a significant turning point in the history of healthcare in this country.  With the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)in 2010 and the upcoming elections in November 2012 the debate about marketsand government in health care is intense.  In this memo I will explain thebenefits of competitive markets and then explain why the health care market differs. I will finish with a discussion of the ACA and how it addresses theseissues.
            Competitive markets have been the foundation of an Americaneconomy that is the largest in the world.  Competition for profit spursinnovation, contains prices, and gives the consumer choice.  Innovationresults when companies consistently push the envelope with new technologies,products, and production processes in an effort to expand their market share andmaximize profits.  Competition alsoworks to keep prices for consumers low.  Companies search for new, moreeconomical methods of production and reduce inefficiencies in their businessmodels.  Southwest Airlines, for example, has repeatedly reduced operatingcosts by eliminating “frills” and shortening turnaround time between flights inorder to keep their prices competitive.  Lastly, markets give the consumerchoice.  In truly competitive markets, many businesses provide the same orslightly variable products from which the consumer can choose.
            Health care differs from perfect markets in several ways, however. First, many view health care as a human right and believe access tohealth care should not be based on employment status or ability to pay. Second, health care is an unpredictable need and often catastrophicallyexpensive.  An insurance market is a viable solution.  The twoclassic problems in the health insurance market, however, are moral hazard andadverse selection.  Moral hazard is the principle that after obtaininginsurance, patients will seek care they do not need, because it is free at the“point of sale.”  Adverse selectionis the principle that patients know more about their state of health thaninsurance companies and therefore will buy insurance only when they need it. This leads to the third pitfall of a competitive health care market.  Competitive markets assume perfectinformation.  The informationasymmetry in health care is undeniable and unavoidable, both between insurancecompanies and patients (adverse selection) and between patients and theirproviders.  Patients often do not know their medical needs and rely on theprovider (i.e. physician, hospital, etc) for advice, often in times ofemergency and stress.  These issuescannot be addressed in a competitive market for health care and thus requiregovernment intervention.
            The ACA contains solutions to many of these challenges that makesense.  First, the ACA provides access for an estimated 32 of the 50million people in the US for whom the current system was failing, increasing equityin a way the market cannot.  Previously, affordable health insurance was availableonly through Medicare, Medicaid, and employer-sponsored insurance, incentivizedthrough tax subsidies to companies who provide insurance for their employees.  Second, companies were not mandated toprovide insurance to employees, nor individuals to carry it.  This created equity and adverseselection issues, especially for the individual market.  The ACA now implements a mandate with subsidiesfor persons unable to afford to buy insurance on their own.  Third, the ACA places an emphasis onquality and transparency.  Regulatingquality measures gives consumers more information and power to make rationaldecisions about where they will seek care.  The insurance exchanges promote transparency whenindividuals are choosing a coverage plan. These are important interventions to improve information symmetry.

            Inconclusion, markets have been extremely successful in this country.  However, the health care market needsgovernment intervention to correct market failures and there are many models toachieve this.  Working within thecurrent system, however, the ACA does a good job ensuring greater access andequity, mitigating adverse selection, and protecting consumers from informationasymmetry.  I recommend it for yoursupport.

Renegotiating Reimbursement: Good Policy or Good PR?

Yesterday Partners Health Care, Massachusetts largest health system, voluntarily disposed of its current contract with Tufts Health Plan and renegotiated a new four year agreement that is expected to lower the health reimbursements they receive by about $105 million dollars over the next four years.

This is significant.  In a conversation I had with a Partners executive two months ago he shared that the Partners negotiating team often leaves their contract meetings with groups like Tufts feeling "proud" of the deals they are able to strike with health insurers.  My impression was that Partners, with the largest market share of any hospital system in Massachusetts, knows it can throw its weight around and does quite willingly.

Not any more.  Partners' decision to rework its contract with Tufts, following a similar renegotiation last year with Blue Cross Blue Shield that is estimated to save $240 million dollars, was likely due to the following.

• Altruism: although not likely the biggest factor, Partners CEO Gary Gotlieb did state that one reason for accepting smaller increases in reimbursements going forward is the growing burden of health care costs on families and businesses.
• Government pressure: the political environment in Massachusetts, and in many areas of the country, is such that all hospitals understand that costs must be cut voluntarily or else the government is likely to do it for them.  With Massachusetts congress toying with rate setting as a way to control out of control medical costs, hospitals would rather be a part of a pre-emptive solution.
• ACOs: Partners was recently announced as one of 32 Pioneer ACOs set to begin this year.  As part of the agreement, ACOs commit to generating at least 50% of their revenue from business models similar to that of the Pioneer Medicare program.  This can only be accomplished through agreements with insurers, employer health plans, and/or Medicaid (called "Participation of Other Payers" in the CMS Pioneer ACO Fact Sheet).  As part of Partners' new agreement with Tufts, approximately 70% of the patients in the plan will now be reimbursed via a global payment structure, shifting significant risk to Partners and forcing them to find ways to contain costs for all their patients, not only the Medicare population.  This is exactly the goal of the ACO, and to the extent that Partners' participation in the Pioneer program is influencing this new agreement with Tufts, the ACO model is succeeding.

Whatever the reasons, I applaud any move by hospital systems to voluntarily forego future payment.  Additionally, I applaud any move toward global payments and the taking on of risk by hospital and physician groups.  However, scale must always be kept in perspective.  While $105 million dollars is no small amount, with an annual budget of over $8 billion dollars and capital expenses totaling $3.2 billion dollars over 5 years, it doesn't seem like so much.  Additionally, there has been little talk of where the $105 million dollars in "cuts" to Partners bottom line will come from.  The hope is that money will be saved through care coordination and a focus on the high utilizers or perhaps a reduction in capital investments year over year.  I imagine that if savings do not materialize, however, chronically underfunded mental health and substance abuse programs will instead be on the chopping block, and this would be an unwelcome result.

Despite my significant skepticism of the hospital market environment in Massachusetts and at the risk of being duped by what may turn out to be simply a PR move, I am encouraged that, whether it be altruism, the political environment, government policies, the market at work, or some combination of these, the system appears to be working.  At least for today.

Price Discrimination and Hidden Negotiations

Uwe Reinhardt of the New York Times blog Economix recently wrote about an issue that has been perplexing me of late. How do hospitals and providers in the same state and even the same community charge such different prices for the exact same services they provide? Similarly but in the reverse, how do health insurance companies, seemingly competing with each other in the same market, pay such different prices for the exact same services? Isn't our free market health care system supposed to lower costs through good old-fashioned market competition?

I thought so, but it doesn't seem to.

The contribution of high and rising unit costs to our overall health cost crisis was the subject of the recent September Health Affairs issue. The same cost conundrum was detailed in 2003 and has been described in many other times and places as well. In addition to describing the problem, the recent Health Affairs issue also includes a section devoted to "strategies to cut costs" which includes the following ideas: a weight loss program, telehealth innovation, successful collaborative care models, and bundled payment reform. But haven't we seen this all before?

None of these ideas address the fact that price discrimination and hidden negotiations are contributing to the rising costs in our system. There seems to me to be three (overly simplistic) options to reduce high unit costs.

1. Improve price competition among payers and providers. Massachusetts recently introduced recommendations on provider price reform. One recommendation was to open up the secret negotiations that now take place between hospitals and insurance companies in an effort to introduce transparency to the process. The goal is to reduce some of the variability that now exists by introducing real competition back into the "market."
2. The second idea was also approached in the same recommendation set and is considerably farther left. Regulate prices. If the market can't be relied upon to drive competition, the other option is to strip competition from the system entirely. In this setting I can imagine some immediate concerns: heavy government control, decreased innovation, lower salaries, not mention a serious lack of political feasibility. There is a third option, however.
3. Many countries (Germany, Switzerland, Belgium) operate systems whereby providers and payers negotiate prices on a regional level, but in a coordinated fashion. The negotiations do not occur between individual hospitals and insurance companies, but rather take place between formed coalitions. This encourages active participation, allows for regional variability, but eliminates the price discrimination and hidden negotiation practices currently employed in the US.

Even with a very introductory understanding of economics I am able to see that the current system of price setting is extremely inefficient. It neither allows the free market to function (which requires widely available information among all parties involved) nor for government oversight. In the current system monopoly (in markets where large providers dominate) and monopsony (in markets where large insurance dominates) run free. Both are market failures.

We must move from a hidden process of back-room deals to a more transparent and competitive system. If we are not able to, government price regulation may be our only choice, because our high and growing unit costs are entirely unsustainable.

JK-R